VERMONT LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

GRIEVANCE OF:	)	
	)	DOCKET NO. 17-05
KOBE KELLEY	)	

FINDINGS OF FACT, OPINION AND ORDER

Statement of Case

On January 26, 2017, the Vermont State Employees' Association ("VSEA") filed a grievance on behalf of Kobe Kelley ("Grievant"), alleging that the State of Vermont ("State") violated Article 31 of the collective bargaining agreement between the State and VSEA for the Non-Management Unit, effective July 1, 2016, to June 30, 2018, ("Contract") by requiring Grievant to use annual leave rather than sick leave for part of the time he was absent from work due to a non-work injury.

A hearing was held before Labor Relations Board Members Gary Karnedy, Chairperson; Edward W. Clark, Jr., and Robert Greemore on August 31, 2017. VSEA General Counsel Timothy Belcher represented Grievant. Assistant Attorney General Melanie Kehne represented the State. The parties filed post-hearing briefs on September 29, 2017.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Contract provides in pertinent part as follows:

ARTICLE 31
SICK LEAVE

1. PURPOSE
To establish the State's policies and practices which provide for a classified employee to be absent from duty with pay in the event of an illness or injury.

2. POLICY

It is the policy of the State to help protect the income of a classified employee who cannot work due to illness or injury . . . Sick leave shall be administered in accordance with the following provisions:

. . .

(b) Use of sick leave

(1) The use of earned sick leave credits shall be authorized by an appointing authority or his or her delegated representative for an employee who is absent from work and unable to perform his or her duties because of illness, injury . . . . . .

ARTICLE 35
PARENTAL LEAVE/FAMILY LEAVE

1. POLICY

It is the policy of the State to permit employees reasonable time off to care for dependent children in instances such as illness, birth, or adoption, and in cases of serious illness of a member of an employee's immediate family or for their own serious illness. Leave for such purposes is provided by both federal and state statutes ("statutory leave"). Vermont's Parental and Family Leave Act, 21 V.S.A. § 470 et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., establish the rights and obligations of employees and employers pertaining to such leaves.

The following provisions integrate the basic requirements of the statutes and this collective bargaining agreement ("Agreement"), but do not create a waiver by the State or by the employees of other rights and/or obligations under this Agreement. In the event of any conflict created by the amendment of statute or otherwise, the rights and responsibilities of the State and employees will be determined by statute, except to the extent that such amendments would diminish the rights to which the employee is entitled under the terms of this Agreement. . .

2. DEFINITIONS

For purposes of this Article, the following definitions shall apply. . .

(e) "Serious illness" means an accident, injury, illness, disease, or physical or mental condition that: poses imminent danger of death, requires inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical facility; or requires continuing in-home care under the direction of a physician or health care provider. . .

5. FAMILY LEAVE – LEAVE FOR SERIOUS ILLNESS

(a) In the case of serious illness of an employee or of a member of an employee's immediate family, Family Leave shall be granted on request and receipt of medical certification of the serious illness and the amount of leave time needed. Such Family Leave shall be unpaid, except as provided in section (b) below.

(b) During the Family Leave, at the employee's option the employee may use up to six (6) weeks of any accrued paid leave, including, but not limited to, sick leave, annual leave and personal leave. Thereafter, employees may use only the following

> accrued paid leaves in the following order: compensatory time, personal time and annual leave. No combination of paid and unpaid leaves shall extend the statutory Family Leave beyond twelve (12) weeks. Notwithstanding the foregoing, even if statutory Family Leave is exhausted, this Agreement's sick leave, unpaid medical leave and administrative leave provisions are still applicable and may provide for additional leave consistent with these provisions.
> (VSEA Exhibit 16)

2. Grievant worked for the Vermont Agency of Transportation for approximately 13 years as a surveyor before retiring from state service on or about July 7, 2017.

3. Grievant fractured his knee in July 2016 while on vacation in North Carolina. Grievant contacted his supervisor immediately after he fractured his knee. Grievant was placed on sick leave status because of the injury (VSEA Exhibit 5).

4. Grievant understood at the time of his knee fracture that he had accrued enough accumulated sick leave to cover the entire period of his anticipated incapacity, and intended to use the accrued sick leave for that purpose. He did not understand the provisions of the Contract or state and federal statutes governing parental and family leave. He did not intend to use any leave other than sick leave (VSEA Exhibit 5).

5. When Grievant contacted his supervisor to report his knee fracture, the supervisor informed Grievant "I'm getting you on FMLA", or words to that effect. When Grievant returned to Vermont after his knee fracture, he met with his supervisor on July 19, 2016. Grievant's supervisor asked him to fill out a form entitled "State of Vermont Employee Request for Family or Medical Leave". Grievant completed and signed the form on July 19, 2016. The form provided: "This form is to be completed by the employee when requesting leave that qualifies as Family or Parental Leave. Family leave is for an EMPLOYEE'S OWN 'serious illness' . . ." The form further provided: "I hereby request approval for a Family or Parental Leave, beginning on _____ (date). I expect the need for the leave to continue until about _____

(date). Grievant filled in "7/7/2016" as the beginning date for leave, and "9/1/2016" as the expected end date. Grievant checked the box on the form next to the statement providing: "I request Family or Parental Leave for the following reason: . . . a serious health condition that makes me unable to perform my job". The form contained further language that provided in pertinent part:

> 3. I am aware that, if I am eligible under the State/VSEA Collective Bargaining Agreement and applicable statutes, I have the right:
> . . .
> - to use, at my option, up to six weeks of any accrued paid leave, including sick, annual and personal leave and compensatory time, during such a leave, but that no combination of paid and unpaid leave may extend the leave beyond 12 weeks . . .
> - to request other types of paid or unpaid leave in accordance with the order of leave specified in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. . .
>
> 4. I am aware that the State of Vermont will count this leave against my parental or family leave entitlement under both the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2501, et seq. and the Vermont Parental and Family Leave Act, 21 V.S.A. 470 et seq., in circumstances where I qualify for leave under those statutes.
> . . .
> (VSEA Exhibit 6)

6. When Grievant filled out the form, Grievant and his supervisor did not discuss his rights under the sick leave article or family and parental leave article of the Contract. Grievant understood that he would continue on sick leave status for the duration of his incapacity (VSEA Exhibit 5).

7. As of August 25, 2016, Grievant had accumulated 466.82 hours of sick leave, 109.6 hours of annual leave and 0.14 hours of compensatory time (VSEA Exhibit 8).

8. Mary Hanigan, Human Resources Administrator for the Agency of Administration, sent Grievant a letter dated August 25, 2016, providing in pertinent part:

> On July 7, 2016, you requested a medical leave citing a serious health condition that makes you unable to perform your job. . .
>
> The absence from work will be counted against your Family and Medical Leave entitlement under the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) . . . and the

> Vermont Parental and Family Leave Act. . . According to the provisions of the FMLA, you are entitled to twelve (12) weeks of leave in a twelve (12) month period beginning with the first day the leave is used. During the Family Medical Leave of Absence, you may use up to six weeks of any accrued leave should you wish to receive payment during that time. Thereafter, you **<u>may use only</u>** the following accrued paid leaves in the following order: Compensatory time, personal time and annual leave. . . .
> (VSEA Exhibit 8, emphasis in original)

9. Grievant was not aware until he received this August 25, 2016, letter that his ability to use sick leave would expire after six weeks.

10. Grievant returned to work on August 29, 2016. Grievant used six weeks of sick leave during the first six weeks of his incapacity to work. He used five days of annual leave covering the period from the end of these six weeks until his return to work.

11. The collective bargaining agreements between VSEA and the State since 1976 have included a Sick Leave article. The Sick Leave articles of these agreements have never contained a limit on how much of an employee's accrued sick leave he or she could use for a qualifying period of sickness or injury (VSEA Exhibits 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 28, 29).

12. In 1989, Vermont enacted the Parental and Family Leave Act, 21 V.S.A. §§ 470 *et seq.*, which provided covered employees with 12 weeks of unpaid leave during a 12-month period for parental or family leave, including an employee's own serious illness. The Act included the following provisions:

> 21 V.S.A. § 472(b). During the leave, at the employee's option, the employee may use accrued sick leave or vacation leave or any other accrued leave, not to exceed six weeks. Utilization of accrued leave shall not extend the leave provided herein.
> . . .
> 21 V.S.A. § 472(g). An employer may adopt a leave policy more generous than the leave policy provided by this subchapter. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to diminish an employer's obligation to comply with any collective bargaining agreement or any employment benefit program or plan which provides greater leave rights than the right provided by this subchapter. A collective bargaining agreement or employment benefit program or plan may not diminish rights provided by this subchapter. . .

13. In 1990, the State and VSEA negotiated the first Parental Leave/Family Leave article in the collective bargaining agreements. They did not extend the article to apply to the employee's own illness or injury (VSEA Exhibit 10).

14. In 1993, the United States Congress enacted the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 *et seq.* It provided covered employees with 12 weeks of unpaid leave during a 12-month period for certain family or parental care, including an employee's own serious illness. The Act included the following provisions:

> 29 U.S.C. §2612(d)(2)B) – An eligible employee may elect, or an employer may require the employee, to substitute any of the accrued paid vacation leave, personal leave, or medical or sick leave of the employee for leave provided in subparagraph (C) or (D) of subsection (a)(1) for any part of the 12-week period of such leave under such subsection, except that nothing in this subchapter shall require an employer to provide paid sick leave or paid medical leave in any situation in which such employer would not normally provide such paid leave . .
>
> 29 U.S.C. §2652(a) – Nothing in this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall be construed to diminish the obligation of an employer to comply with any collective bargaining agreement or any employment benefit program or plan that provides greater family or medical leave rights to employees than the rights established under this Act or any amendment made by this Act.

15. In 1994, the State and VSEA negotiated language in the collective bargaining agreements that amended the Parental Leave/Family Leave article. They did not extend the article to apply to the employee's own illness or injury (VSEA Exhibit 11).

16. In negotiations for successor collective bargaining agreements to the agreements expiring June 30, 1999, the State proposed amending the Parental Leave/Family Leave article. The State's initial proposal included the following provision:

> 1. POLICY
> Parental and Family Leaves are covered by both federal and state statutes that establish many of the rights of employees and the responsibilities of employers. The following provisions integrate the basic requirements of the statutes and the collective bargaining agreement. In the event of any conflict created by the amendment of statute or otherwise, the rights and responsibilities of the State and employees will be determined by statute.

(VSEA Exhibit 12)

17. The State also proposed for the first time that the employee's own serious illness would be covered by the Parental Leave/Family Leave article (VSEA Exhibit 12).

18. When the negotiations reached the Fact-Finding stage, the State changed its position with respect to the proposed language in Section 1 of the Parental Leave/Family Leave article. The sentence in the original proposal beginning "The following provisions . . ." was changed to now state: "The following provisions integrate the basic requirements of the statutes and this collective bargaining agreement ("Agreement"), but do not create a waiver by the State or the employees of other rights and obligations under this agreement". The State stated during the fact-finding process that its proposed Parental Leave/Family Leave "language accomplishes the following: . . . Makes clear that the granting of the leaves required by law does not diminish benefits which have previously been bargained for by the union and are included in the contracts" (VSEA Exhibit 13).

19. In the collective bargaining agreements ultimately negotiated by the State and VSA effective July 1, 1999, to June 30, 2001, the Parental Leave/Family Leave article was amended to add an employee's own serious illness to be covered by the article, and to accept the State's Fact Finding proposal on Section 1 of the article with the exception that the following phrase was added to the last sentence of the section: "except to the extent that such amendments would diminish the rights to which the employee is entitled under the terms of this Agreement ".

20. The pertinent language negotiated has not changed substantively since then and is substantively the same language contained in the current collective bargaining agreement set forth above in Finding of Fact No. 1 (VSEA Exhibits 12-15).

21. The Department of Human Resources advised state agencies after the 1999-2001 collective bargaining agreement became effective to apply the cascading language of the revised Parental Leave/Family Leave article to cap the use of sick leave for an employee's serious illness at six weeks in any year, and then apply other forms of leave for the following six weeks. Despite this advice, state departments have not consistently applied the cascading language of the Parental Leave/Family article to an employee's own serious illness.

22. Human Resource functions in state government were centralized in the Department of Human Resources beginning in 2011. Since then, the cascading language of the Parental Leave/Family article has been applied more consistently by the State to an employee's own serious illness, but it is not always applied consistently.

23. VSEA was not aware of any instance from 1999 to early 2014 in which the State applied the contract language to provide that the use of sick leave for an employee's serious illness was capped at six weeks in any year, and then other forms of leave were applied for the following six weeks. Although the Department of Human Resources advised state agencies to so apply the contract, the State has not produced specific evidence of any instances where the contract language was so applied. Since early 2014, VSEA has been aware that the State has taken the position that the Parental Leave/Family Leave article provides that the use of sick leave for an employee's serious illness is capped at six weeks in any year, and then other forms of leave would be applied for the following six weeks (VSEA Exhibit 17).

OPINION

Grievant alleges that the State violated the Sick Leave article, Article 31, of the Contract by requiring Grievant to use annual leave rather than sick leave for one of the seven weeks he was absent from work due to a non-work injury even though Grievant had enough accrued sick leave to cover the seventh week of absence. Grievant asserts that the State's actions violate the clear and unambiguous language of the Contract, and that this is supported by the parties' intent as shown by bargaining history. Grievant contends that employees have an unlimited right to use accrued sick leave if they are sick, and that VSEA did not give up that right in 1999 when it agreed to revise the Parental Leave/Family Leave Article of the collective bargaining agreements.

The State contends that Grievant has failed to meet the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the State violated the Contract. The State asserts that it applied the clear and unambiguous language of a different provision of the Contract – the cascade language in Section 5 the Parental Leave/Family Leave article, Article 35 – by requiring Grievant to take five days of annual leave after he had taken six weeks of paid sick leave for his serious injury.

In determining whether the employer violated the provisions of the Contract in this matter, the Board follows the rules of contract construction developed by the Vermont Supreme Court. The cardinal principle in the construction of any contract is to give effect to the true intention of the parties. Grievance of Cronan, et al, 151 Vt. 576, 579 (1989). A contract must be construed, if possible, to give effect to every part, and from the parts to form a harmonious whole. In re Grievance of VSEA on Behalf of "Phase Down" Employees, 139 Vt. 63, 65 (1980). The contract provisions must be viewed in their entirety and read together. In re Stacey, 138 Vt.

68, 72 (1980). A contract will be interpreted by the common meaning of its words where the language is clear. Id. at 71. If clear and unambiguous, the provisions of a contract must be given force and effect and be taken in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. Swett v. Vermont State Colleges, 141 Vt. 275 (1982).

If analysis of the contract language results in a determination that the language is clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence under such circumstances should not be considered as it would alter the understanding of the parties embodied in the language they chose to best express their intent. Hackel v. Vermont State Colleges, 140 Vt. 446, 452 (1981). The Board will not read terms into a contract unless they arise by necessary implication. In re Stacey, 138 Vt. at 71. The law will presume that the parties meant, and intended to be bound by, the plain and express language of their undertakings; it is the duty of the Board to construe contracts; not to make or remake them for the parties, or ignore their provisions. Vermont State Colleges Faculty Federation v. Vermont State Colleges, 141 Vt. 138, 144 (1982).

Ambiguity exists where the disputed language will allow more than one reasonable interpretation. In re Grievance of Vermont State Employees' Association and Dargie, 179 Vt. 228, 234 (2005). The threshold question of whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Isbrandtsen v. North Branch Corp., 150 Vt. 575, 577 (1988). Breslauer v. Fayston School District, 163 Vt. 416, 425 (1995). Grievance of Spear, 32 VLRB 202, 206 (2012). Ambiguity will be found where a writing in and of itself supports a different interpretation from that which appears when it is read in light of the surrounding circumstances, and both interpretations are reasonable. Isbrandtsen, 150 Vt. at 579. Breslauer, 163 Vt. at 425. Spear, 32 VLRB at 206.

If the analysis of the contract language leads to a conclusion that the language is ambiguous because it allows more than one reasonable interpretation, it is appropriate to look to

the extrinsic evidence of bargaining history, custom or usage, and established past practices to ascertain whether such evidence provides any guidance in interpreting the meaning of the contract. Nzomo, et al. v. Vermont State Colleges, 136 Vt. 97, 101-102 (1978). Grievance of Majors, 11 VLRB 30, 35 (1988). Grievance of Cronan, 151 Vt. at 579. Burlington Area Public Employees Union, Local 1343, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Champlain Water District, 156 Vt. 516, 520-521 (1991).

Where the language used in the contract will admit of more than one interpretation, we will look at the situation and motives of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, and the object sought to be attained by it. Grievance of Gorruso, 150 Vt. 139, 143 (1988). Bargaining history is relevant to the extent that it reveals the result contemplated by the parties and their true intentions when they negotiated the contract language. Id. at 145. Grievance of Cole and Cross, 28 VLRB 345, 371-372 (2006). Grievance of Candon, 31 VLRB 398, 407 (2011). Also, the context of a particular usage and application of a contract provision may vary the normal meaning of an agreement's language where it appears that the parties contracted with reference to the usage. Grievance of Cronan, 151 Vt. at 579.

Further, interpretation of an agreement may involve interpolating from a written text solutions not expressly spelled out in the text. Burlington Area Public Employees Union, Local 1343, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Champlain Water District, 156 Vt. at 520. This may require blending textual interpretations and the "contracts implied in fact" in the form of established past practices. Id. at 521. The Supreme Court has held that, "to the extent that contract provisions are ambiguous, the practical construction placed upon an instrument by the parties would be controlling in determining the meaning of the instrument." In re Grievance of Cole and Cross, 184 Vt. 64, 73-74 (2008) Grievance of Cronan, 151 Vt. at 579. A practical construction of

contract provisions involves evaluating the context in which the parties negotiated to determine the parties' intent or how a particular contract provision was applied following the execution of the collective bargaining agreement containing the contract provision. Id.

In applying these standards here, we first examine whether the contract language is clear and unambiguous. Article 35, Section 5, of the Contract provides that "(i)n the case of serious illness of an employee . . . Family Leave shall be granted on request". It further provides: "During the Family Leave, at the employee's option the employee may use up to six (6) weeks of any accrued paid leave, including, but not limited to, sick leave, annual leave and personal leave. Thereafter, employees may use only the following accrued paid leaves in the following order: compensatory time, personal time and annual leave."

Article 35, Section 5, needs to be considered together with Section 1 of Article 35, the "Policy" section of the article. Section 1, in pertinent part, sets forth the policy of the State to permit employees reasonable time off for the employee's own serious illness. It references the Vermont Parental and Family Leave Act and the federal Family Medical Leave Act as providing leave for such purposes and establishing "the rights and obligations of employees and employers pertaining to such leaves." It further contains the following paragraph:

> The following provisions integrate the basic requirements of the statutes and this collective bargaining agreement ("Agreement"), but do not create a waiver by the State or by the employees of other rights and/or obligations under this Agreement. In the event of any conflict created by the amendment of statute or otherwise, the rights and responsibilities of the State and employees will be determined by statute, except to the extent that such amendments would diminish the rights to which the employee is entitled under the terms of this Agreement. . .

This paragraph in Section 1 makes it clear that State and employee rights and obligations concerning leave in instances of an employee's serious illness are not necessarily governed just by Article 35 and state and federal statutes. Instead, these provisions do not override and do not

diminish other rights and obligations set forth in the Contract. The sick leave provisions of Article 31 of the Contract constitute other rights and obligations in situations where an employee is ill or injured.

In construing the contract provisions in their entirety, we conclude that Articles 31 and 35 do not present a model of clarity on how to address the interplay between sick leave and family leave in the event of the serious illness of an employee. We note that each party here contends that the contract language is clear and unambiguous but reach different conclusions as to what the language means. The general language of Article 35, Section 1, of the Contract, without specific references to the Contract's sick leave provisions, result in ambiguity. One reasonable interpretation of the contract language is that an employee is entitled by Article 31 to use any accrued sick leave for the duration of the serious illness without limitation and without invoking the family leave cascade provisions of Article 35. Another reasonable interpretation of the contract language is that an injury or illness which qualifies as a serious illness for family leave purposes is governed exclusively by the cascade provisions of Article 35. Since the disputed language allows more than one reasonable interpretation, we conclude that it is ambiguous.

Thus, we look to the extrinsic evidence of bargaining history, custom or usage, and established past practice to ascertain whether this evidence provides guidance in interpreting the meaning of the Contract. The bargaining history leading to the amendment of the Parental Leave/Family Leave article in the 1999-2001 collective bargaining agreements is instructive. The State proposed for the first time in these negotiations that the employee's own serious illness would be covered by the Parental Leave/Family Leave article. The State's initial proposal on this article included a provision that, if there was a conflict between federal and state statutes and the collective bargaining agreement, statutory provisions would determine the outcome.

If this proposal of the State had been agreed to by the parties, it would be clear that leave provisions of statute would supersede any contrary sick leave provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. However, the State changed this proposal when negotiations reached the fact-finding stage. It amended the language of the proposal to provide that the family leave provisions of the article "do not create a waiver by the State or the employees of other rights and obligations under this agreement". The State stated during the fact-finding process that its proposed Parental Leave/Family Leave "language accomplishes the following: . . . Makes clear that the granting of the leaves required by law does not diminish benefits which have previously been bargained for by the union and are included in the contracts." VSEA ultimately accepted the State's Fact-Finding proposal on the amendment of the Parental Leave/Family Leave article with the exception that the parties also agreed to a further provision similar in effect to the above fact-finding amendment offered by the State.

This bargaining history is relevant in that it appears to reveal the result contemplated by the parties and their intentions when they negotiated the contract language. It is apparent that the parties intended that the extension of family leave coverage to an employee's own serious illness would not diminish benefits previously included in the collective bargaining agreements. The right to use any accrued sick leave for the duration of the serious illness without limitation and without invoking the family leave cascade provisions is such a benefit. The normal meaning of the family leave cascade provision in Article 35 is varied when it is considered in the context of the parties agreeing to this provision with reference to the particular usage and application of the sick leave provision.

Our conclusion in this regard is unchanged when we examine the established practices in state government after the 1991-2001 collective bargaining agreements became effective. VSEA

was not aware of any instance from 1999 to early 2014 in which the State applied the contract language to provide that the use of sick leave for an employee's serious illness was capped at six weeks in any year, and then other forms of leave were applied for the following six weeks. Although the Department of Human Resources advised state agencies to apply the cascading language of the revised Parental Leave/Family Leave article to cap the use of sick leave for an employee's serious illness, the State has not produced specific evidence of any instances where state agencies acted accordingly.

The failure of the State to produce such evidence substantially weakens its contract interpretation position. The way leave was handled by state agencies in instances of serious illnesses of employees, following the execution of the collective bargaining agreement containing the family leave cascade provision, indicates a practical construction of contract provisions by the parties more in support of Grievant's claim in this case than the position of the State.

In sum, we conclude that the State violated Article 31 of the Contract by requiring Grievant to use five days of annual leave for one of the seven weeks he was absent for work due to his serious injury. Grievant was entitled to use accrued sick leave for this week. His wish to do so was prevented by the State's position that the cascade provisions of Article 35, Section 5, of the Contract required that he use family leave for this week. The State was entitled to exercise its undisputed right to designate Grievant's leave for a+++++ knee fracture as counting towards Grievant's annual limits under the state and federal family and medical leave statutes, but the State did not have the right to compel Grievant to use annual leave during this period. As a result, Grievant lost five days of annual leave and should be reimbursed for the value of the leave.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing findings of fact and for the foregoing reasons, it is ordered:

1. The Grievance of Kobe Kelley is sustained;
2. The State of Vermont shall pay Grievant five days of pay at his rate of pay at the time of his retirement, plus 12 percent interest per annum, from the date the State would have paid Grievant final wages after his retirement until payment is made to him; and
3. Such payment shall be made within 30 days of this final order.

Dated this 7th day of November 2017, at Montpelier, Vermont.

VERMONT LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

/s/ Gary F. Karnedy

Gary F. Karnedy, Chairperson

/s/ Edward W. Clark, Jr.

Edward W. Clark, Jr.

/s/ Robert Greemore

Robert Greemore